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Abstract	
Scholars	have	debated	whether	social	media	platforms,	by	allowing	users	to	select	
the	information	they	are	exposed	to,	may	lead	people	to	isolate	themselves	from	
viewpoints	they	disagree	with,	thereby	serving	as	political	“echo	chambers.”	We	
investigate	hypotheses	concerning	the	circumstances	under	which	Twitter	users	who	
communicate	about	elections	would	engage	with	(a)	supportive,	(b)	oppositional,	
and	(c)	mixed	political	networks.	Based	on	online	surveys	of	representative	samples	
of	Italian	and	German	individuals	who	posted	at	least	one	Twitter	message	about	
elections	in	2013,	we	find	substantial	differences	in	the	extent	to	which	social	media	
facilitates	exposure	to	similar	vs.	dissimilar	political	views.	Our	results	suggest	that	
exposure	to	supportive,	oppositional,	or	mixed	political	networks	on	social	media	can	
be	explained	by	broader	patterns	of	political	conversation	(i.e.	structure	of	offline	
networks)	and	specific	habits	in	the	political	use	of	social	media	(i.e.the	intensity	of	
political	discussion).	These	findings	suggest	that	disagreement	persists	on	social	
media	even	when	ideological	homophily	is	the	modal	outcome,	and	that	scholars	
should	pay	more	attention	to	specific	situational	and	dispositional	factors	when	
evaluating	the	implications	of	social	media	for	political	communication.	
	
Keywords:	social	media,	political	discussion,	political	homophily,	political	disagreement,	political	networks		
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Introduction	Democracy	is	founded	on	freedom	of	public	opinion	(Manin,	1997)	and	for	opinions	to	be	freely	formed,	citizens	need	diverse	but	reliable	sources	of	information	(Dahl,	1998).	At	the	same	time,	the	likelihood	that	individuals	encounter	diverse	and	reliable	viewpoints	depends	on	their	informational	environments	(Prior,	2007).	Whereas	research	suggests	that	the	mass	media	are	more	likely	to	expose	individuals	to	diverse	information	in	comparison	with	face-to-face	discussions,	scholars	have	debated	whether	digital	media,	because	of	their	choice-enhancing	affordances,	are	more	conducive	to	self-segregation.	In	this	article,	we	investigate	the	role	of	social	media	in	exposing	individuals	to	different	viewpoints	on	the	basis	of	unique	representative	online	surveys	of	Twitter	users	who	posted	campaign-related	messages	during	the	general	elections	of	2013	in	Germany	and	Italy.		We	demonstrate	that	the	Twitter	users	we	sampled	were	more	likely	to	employ	social	media	to	engage	with	networks	that	supported	rather	than	challenged	their	views,	but	that	disagreement	persisted	on	social	media	even	when	homophily	was	the	modal	outcome.	The	more	individuals	exchanged	election-related	messages	on	social	media,	the	more	likely	they	were	to	be	part	of	networks	that	supported	their	views.	At	the	same	time,	the	ideological	composition	of	respondents’	online	networks	closely	reflected	their	face-to-face	networks,	so	
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individuals	encountering	oppositional	and	mixed	political	viewpoints	offline	tended	to	have	similar	experiences	on	social	media.	We	also	show	that,	when	online	and	offline	experiences	with	agreement	or	disagreement	do	not	perfectly	overlap,	political	networks	on	social	media	are	more	likely	to	add	to,	rather	than	detract	from,	the	overall	diversity	of	political	viewpoints	that	individuals	encounter.			 Taken	in	conjunction,	our	findings	suggest	that	political	homophily	on	social	media	is	not	a	universal	outcome	that	all	users	experience	to	an	equivalent	degree.	On	the	contrary,	it	is	a	condition	that	citizens	experience	with	different	degrees	of	intensity	depending	on	their	broader	patterns	of	political	conversation	and	their	specific	habits	in	the	political	use	of	social	media.	In	particular,	individuals	experiencing	homophily	in	their	offline	discussion	networks	and	those	who	are	more	engaged	in	the	exchange	of	political	messages	on	social	media	are	more	likely	than	others	to	encounter	echo	chambers	on	these	platforms.		
Antecedents	to	experience	of	Political	Homophily	on	Social	Media		In	this	study,	we	focus	on	two	main	themes:	the	extent	to	which	social	media	foster	exposure	to	political	agreement	or	disagreement	and	the	extent	to	which,	and	reasons	why,	individuals	vary	in	their	experience	of	political	agreement	and	disagreement	on	social	media.	In	particular,	we	assess	whether	social	media	users	
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are	prone	to	engage	with	three	different	types	of	political	networks,	as	defined	by	Nir	(2011):	“supportive”	networks,	which	primarily	expose	individuals	to	viewpoints	they	agree	with,	“oppositional”	networks	that	primarily	confront	members	with	viewpoints	they	disagree	with,	and	“mixed”	networks	that	feature	both	congruent	and	divergent	positions.1			Political	Agreement	and	Disagreement	on	Social	Media	In	contemporary	media	environments,	citizens	acquire	and	integrate	political	information	received	through	interpersonal	communication,	the	mass	media,	and	digital	media.	Prior	research	suggests	that	these	channels	are	not	equally	likely	to	expose	individuals	to	diverse	viewpoints.	Studies	of	interpersonal	communication	show	that	individuals	gravitate	towards	others	who	share	their	viewpoints	(Huckfeldt	&	Sprague,	1995).	This	pattern	has	been	understood	within	the	rational	choice	paradigm	as	a	strategy	to	acquire	low-cost	information	from	reliable	sources	(Downs,	1957)	and	within	experimental	social	psychology	as	the	result	of	individuals’	desire	for	belief	confirmation	(Festinger,	1957;	Sears	&	Freedman,	1967).	However,	Huckfeldt,	Johnson	and	Sprague	(2004)	demonstrate	that	disagreement	still	persists,	especially	in	low-density	networks	in	which	individuals	
																																																								1	Networks	can	also	be	“neutral”	to	the	extent	that	members	are	not	exposed	to	substantial	levels	of	agreement	or	disagreement—a	category	that	we	treat	as	residual	for	the	purposes	of	this	study.	
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interact	with	“weak	ties”,	that	is,	relatively	distant	acquaintances	who	are	more	likely	to	differ	from	them,	in	comparison	with	close	interaction	partners.	Huckfeldt	et	al.	(2004,	pp.	21-23)	also	note	that	individuals	choose	with	whom	they	talk	not	only	on	the	basis	of	political	homogeneity,	but	also	in	terms	of	commonalities	in	lifestyles,	hobbies,	and	family	life.		The	literature	on	selective	exposure	highlights	that	individuals,	if	given	the	opportunity,	tend	to	choose	media	content	that	matches	their	political	preferences	(Lazarsfeld,	Berelson,	&	Gaudet,	1944;	Garrett,	2009)	and	that	the	mass	media	provide	more	exposure	to	contradictory	viewpoints	when	compared	with	interpersonal	conversations	(Mutz	&	Martin,	2001).	However,	Iyengar	and	Hahn	(2009)	have	shown	that,	in	a	high-choice	media	environment,	citizens	can	craft	personalized	news	diets	that	are	consonant	with	their	political	views.			 With	respect	to	digital	media,	three	different	lines	of	research	can	be	identified	within	the	literature:	(1)	studies	showing	how	the	affordances	of	the	internet,	by	enhancing	opportunities	for	the	selection	of	sources,	facilitate	ideological	self-segregation;	(2)	studies	showing	this	type	of	selectivity,	while	resulting	in	increased	exposure	to	consonant	contents,	does	not	necessarily	lead	to	avoidance	of	dissonant	ones;	and,	(3)	studies	contending	that	inadvertent	exposure	to	political	content	on	the	web	might	act	as	a	counter-balancing	mechanism	increasing	exposure	to	political	disagreement.	
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The	first	strand	of	research	mentioned	emphasizes	that	the	internet’s	selective	nature	–	the	fact	that	it	allows,	and	to	some	degree	compels,	users	to	make	frequent	choices	among	a	variety	of	sources	and	contents	(Bimber	&	Davis,	2003)	–	leads	most	individuals	to	engage	primarily	with	views	similar	to	their	own.	The	general	argument	is	that	the	internet	functions	as	an	“echo	chamber”	in	which	individuals	are	exposed	more	or	less	exclusively	to	consonant	views	and	it	is	supported	by	some	empirical	research.	Gaines	and	Mondak	(2009)	found	that	students	in	a	large	American	university	clustered	on	Facebook	according	to	their	ideological	proclivities.	Bakshy,	Messing,	and	Adamic	(2015)	studied	ten	million	Facebook	users	in	the	U.S.	who	declared	their	ideological	preferences	and	showed	that—even	taking	into	account	the	fact	that	Facebook’s	algorithmic	ranking	of	news	according	to	users’	preferences	limits	the	diversity	of	content	they	are	exposed	to—individuals	are	more	likely	to	engage	with	stories	that	are	consistent	with	their	viewpoints.	Studies	analyzing	large	quantities	of	behavioral	data	likewise	suggest	that	political	networks	on	Twitter	exhibit	high	levels	of	homophily	(Conover	et	al.,	2011;	Barberá,	2014;	Colleoni,	Rozza,	&	Arvidsson,	2014).	At	the	same	time,	Barberá,	Jost,	Nagler,	Tucker,	&	Bonneau	(2016)	observed	that	the	degree	of	homophily	in	information	sharing	on	Twitter	varied	to	a	considerable	extent	according	to	users’	ideology,	context,	and	issue	type.			 The	second	group	of	studies	we	mentioned	suggests	that	the	choice	
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affordances	of	digital	media	are	less	likely	to	produce	self-segregation,	such	as	the	filtering	out	of	dissonant	viewpoints,	in	comparison	with	traditional	forms	of	media.	Based	on	extensive	research,	Holbert,	Garrett,	and	Gleason	concluded	that	the	extent	to	which	people	deliberately	avoid	attitude-discrepant	information	online	had	been	exaggerated	by	previous	research.	To	the	contrary,	they	argue,	“individuals	exhibit	a	stronger	bias	toward	attitude-consistent	information	than	against	attitude-discrepant	information”	(2010,	p.	19).	In	other	words,	political	interactions	on	digital	media	may	entail	increased	exposure	to	viewpoints	users	agree	with,	but	not	necessarily	an	equivalent	avoidance	of	contrary	ideas,	and	thus	do	not	necessarily	result	in	self-segregation.			 Finally,	according	to	the	third	line	of	research	listed	above,	even	if	individuals	select	online	content	and	sources	based	on	their	political	inclinations,	digital	media	also	facilitate	exposure	to	different	viewpoints,	perhaps	inadvertently.	Given	that	individuals	are	more	likely	to	come	across	attitude-discordant	political	content	(often	unintentionally)	in	non-political	online	environments	than	in	overtly	political	spaces	(Wojcieszak	&	Mutz,	2009),	social	media—insofar	as	it	is	often	used	for	non-political	reasons—may	enable	serendipitous	exposure	to	views	that	are	quite	different	from	one’s	own.	Gil	de	Zúñiga	and	Valenzuela	(2011)	show	that	social	media	facilitates	fortuitous	contact	with	weak	ties,	which	is	likely	to	expose	individuals	to	different	political	views.	
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With	respect	to	Twitter,	Colleoni	et	al.	(2014)	suggest	that	the	connections	users	build	between	each	other	exhibit	high	degrees	of	homophily,	but	information	can	also	circulate	across	different	networks	and,	in	the	process,	expose	individuals	to	dissonant	viewpoints	(see	also	Barberá	et	al.,	2016).	Given	that	most	of	the	literature	suggests	that	individuals	are	more	likely	to	seek	agreement	than	disagreement	on	social	media,	we	expected	political	homophily	to	be	prevalent	on	social	media.	Thus,	we	hypothesized	that	in	general	
individuals	would	be	more	likely	to	engage	with	supportive	than	oppositional	or	
mixed	networks	on	social	media	(H1).		Nevertheless,	the	literature	also	provides	some	evidence	that,	under	certain	circumstances	and	for	certain	kinds	of	users,	political	networks	on	social	media	may	differ	from	the	modal	outcome	of	homogeneity.	However,	research	on	what	these	factors	are	and	under	what	conditions	they	operate	has	been	very	limited	so	far.	Although	most	studies	assume	that	conversations	on	social	media	are	characterized	by	some	degree	of	user	control,	scholars	have	generally	failed	to	study	how	different	users	employ	control	affordances,	and	what	implications	such	choices	may	have.	This	is	because	most	scholars	have	treated	important	aspects	of	social	media	usage	as	constants	rather	than	variables.	To	address	this	gap	in	the	literature,	our	next	hypotheses	move	beyond	a	general	assessment	to	address	how	different	individual-level	characteristics	may	explain	variation	in	exposure	to	
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supportive	vs.	contrarian	viewpoints	on	social	media.		The	nexus	between	patterns	of	political	discussion	online	and	offline	We	proceed	from	the	premise	that	the	role	of	social	media	in	fostering	or	forestalling	exposure	to	a	diversity	of	political	opinions	cannot	be	understood	without	considering	the	specific	goals	and	circumstances	of	different	individuals’	social	media	activity	as	well	as	their	broader	patterns	of	political	conversation.	This	is	because	(a)	social	media	are	fundamentally	intertwined	with	offline	dynamics,	and	(b)	social	media	are	high-choice	environments	in	which	individuals	to	some	extent	choose	their	levels	of	engagement	with	politics	and	the	kinds	of	contents	and	sources	they	encounter.	Political	networks	on	social	media	do	not	exist	in	a	vacuum;	they	are	part	of	a	broader	ecosystem	of	information	flows	in	which	individuals	play	different	roles	and	exercise	different	degrees	of	agency.	According	to	Chadwick	(2013),	contemporary	political	communication	systems	must	be	understood	as	“hybrid”,	i.e.,	combining	different	logics	from	older	and	newer	media	as	well	as	integrating	face-to-face	and	digital	modes	of	engagement.	This	model	implies	that	we	cannot	consider	social	media	as	separate	from	or	independent	of	face-to-face	conversational	contexts—as	most	prior	research	has	done—and	that	if	we	are	to	understand	the	role	of	social	media	in	facilitating	encounters	with	viewpoints	that	
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are	dissonant	vs.	consonant,	we	must	take	into	account	individuals’	offline	discussion	networks	as	well.	Accordingly,	research	shows	that	individuals	often	use	social	media	to	connect	(and	reconnect)	with	members	of	their	extended	offline	social	networks	(Ellison,	Steinfield,	&	Lampe	2007;	Subrahmanyam, Reich,	Waechter,	&	Espinoza,	2008).	It	is	thus	reasonable	to	expect	that	individuals’	patterns	of	offline	conversation	may	be	largely	reproduced	on	social	media,	especially	insofar	as	online	interactions	involve	the	same	partners	as	face-to-face	encounters.	Moreover,	investigating	the	nexus	between	online	and	offline	networks	of	political	discussion	helps	to	illuminate	the	various	ways	in	which	individuals	approach	political	discussions	in	general.	The	“uses	and	gratifications”	theory	contends	that	individuals	take	advantage	of	the	affordances	of	any	medium	of	communication	to	fulfill	their	needs	and	preferences	(Cho,	Gil	De	Zuniga,	Rojas,	&	Shah,	2003;	Campbell	&	Kwak,	2010).	Taking	offline	networks	into	account	when	assessing	online	networks	not	only	allows	researchers	to	compare	communication	experiences	in	two	different	domains	and	platforms;	it	also	facilitates	an	understanding	of	how	given	individuals	differ	in	their	overall	approaches	to	political	discussion	writ	large.	Finally,	the	extent	to	which	individuals	discuss	politics—and	the	networks	they	develop—may	be	a	function	of	their	psychological	characteristics,	among	
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other	things.	For	instance,	it	is	well	known	that	individuals	differ	considerably	in	the	extent	to	which	they	value	openness	to	new	experiences—as	opposed	to	the	preservation	of	what	is	familiar	and	traditional—and	the	extent	to	which	they	exhibit	open-mindedness	in	the	context	of	opinion	exchange	(e.g.,	Rokeach,	1960;	Kruglanski,	Webster,	&	Klem,	1993;	McCrae,	1996;	Schwartz,	2012).	There	is	some	evidence	that	these	individual	differences	manifest	themselves	in	terms	of	online	behavior:	people	who	score	higher	on	openness	tend	to	have	larger	and	more	diverse	social	media	contacts	and	networks	(Gosling,	Augustine,	Vazire,	Holtzman,	&	Gaddis,	2011;	Bachrach,	Kosinski,	Graepel,	Kohli,	&	Stillwell,	2012).		The	hybridization	of	political	communication,	the	uses	and	gratifications	theory,	and	research	on	personality	and	social	psychology	all	suggest	that	some	degree	of	concordance	is	to	be	expected	when	it	comes	to	the	degree	of	ideological	homophily	in	individuals’	face-to-face	and	social	media	networks.	Thus,	we	hypothesized	that	the	political	composition	of	discussion	networks	that	individuals	
engage	with	on	social	media	would	be	similar	to	the	composition	of	their	offline	
networks	(H2).	Understanding	the	connections	between	face-to-face	and	online	environments	is	also	critical	to	assessing	whether	and	under	what	circumstances	the	use	of	social	media	increases	or	decreases	the	overall	diversity	of	political	information	to	which	one	is	exposed.			
	13		
Political	habits	on	social	media	and	experience	with	agreement	and	disagreement	Once	these	individual	circumstances	and	dispositions	have	been	taken	into	account,	we	also	need	to	consider	how	specific	habits	in	the	political	use	of	social	media	may	affect	the	likelihood	that	users	encounter	either	agreement	or	disagreement	on	these	platforms.	In	a	high-choice	media	environment	people	are	likely	to	be	selective	when	it	comes	to	political	content	they	are	exposed	to	and	with	whom	they	discuss	such	content,	and	this	selectivity	is	likely	to	be	greater	for	those	who	are	high	(vs.	low)	in	the	intensity	with	which	they	engage	with	politics	on	social	media.	This	is	because	the	sheer	abundance	of	potential	content	and	interaction	partners	makes	it	not	only	possible	but	also	necessary	for	individuals	who	are	highly	engaged	in	politics	to	filter	out	truly	divergent	perspectives.	The	more	an	individual	is	exposed	to	political	content	and	engages	in	political	discussion,	the	more	rational	it	is	for	him	or	her	to	filter	messages	in	order	to	maximize	utility	while	minimizing	effort.	Selecting	predominantly	like-minded	sources	and	conversational	partners	is	clearly	one	way	of	attaining	efficiency	in	this	regard.	Moreover,	the	intensity	of	political	discussion	is	likely	to	be	a	reliable	indicator	of	the	strength	of	political	identification	and	discursive	involvement.		The	theory	of	motivated	reasoning	suggests	that	people	tend	to	search	for	information	that	reinforces	their	preexisting	opinions	and	to	avoid	information	that	challenges	them	(Lodge	&	Taber,	2000;	Stroud,	2008).	The	more	involved	in	
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politics	a	given	individual	is,	the	more	likely	it	is	that	he	or	she	wishes	to	be	part	of	an	ideological	community	and	thus	to	exercise	selectivity	in	the	context	of	social	networks.	Lawrence,	Sides	and	Farrell	(2010)	noted	that	most	U.S.	political	blog	readers—who	are	generally	quite	politically	engaged—gravitate	toward	blogs	that	reinforce	their	own	ideological	inclinations,	whereas	very	few	read	blogs	across	the	entire	ideological	spectrum.	Those	who	are	highly	involved	in	political	discussions	on	social	media	may	also	be	more	likely	to	engage	with	likeminded	others.	Therefore,	we	hypothesized	that	the	quantity	of	political	messages	that	
individuals	exchange	on	social	media	would	be	positively	associated	with	the	
likelihood	of	engaging	with	supportive	political	networks	on	these	platforms	(H3).		
Case	Selection	As	highlighted	in	the	previous	section,	most	studies	of	online	discussion	networks	have	focused	on	the	United	States.	This	means	that	we	cannot	be	sure	whether	findings	from	these	studies	can	be	generalized	to	other	Western	democracies.	We	address	this	omission	by	focusing	on	Germany	and	Italy—two	large,	relatively	affluent	European	democracies	that	held	general	elections	in	2013	and	possess	similar	levels	of	Twitter	diffusion	(9%	in	Italy,	7%	in	Germany).2	Unlike	the	U.S.,																																																									2	See	http://wearesocial.net/blog/2014/01/social-digital-mobile-worldwide-2014/	(accessed	31	July	2014).	We	are	aware	that	these	figures	indicate	low	usage	rates	in	the	two	countries.	However,	even	in	countries	where	Twitter	rates	are	higher,	such	as	the	United	States	(around	17%	of	
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both	Italy	and	Germany	are	parliamentary	multi-party	systems	with	mixed,	but	predominantly	proportional,	electoral	laws.	Although	they	differ	from	each	other	in	some	key	respects	–	such	as	mean	levels	of	political	trust	and	the	relative	stability	of	party	systems	and	governments	–	we	did	not	expect	these	differences	to	bear	on	the	structure	and	function	of	online	political	networks.	It	should	be	noted,	given	the	goal	of	this	research,	that	in	multiparty	systems	it	is	often	the	case	that	parties	pursue	niche,	bonding	strategies	aimed	at	mobilizing	relatively	narrow	segments	of	the	population	(Norris	2004,	p.	100-101).	As	a	result,	European	citizens’	ideological	preferences	may	be	more	fragmented	and	multidimensional	in	comparison	with	citizens	of	majoritarian	systems	such	as	the	U.S.		In	testing	our	hypotheses	in	Germany	and	Italy	we	sought	to	assess	the	robustness	of	our	findings	across	different	national	systems	and	to	expand	existing	knowledge	beyond	singular	case	studies	of	the	United	States.			
Data	Investigating	political	discussions	on	social	media	requires	that	we	focus	on	those	individuals	who	take	part	in	such	discussions	rather	than	on	the	entire	voting-age	
																																																																																																																																																																		Americans	used	Twitter	in	2014),	usage	rates	are	still	rather	limited.	Therefore,	as	we	seek	to	clarify	in	the	subsection	“Political	users	of	Twitter	versus	general	population	samples,”	we	do	not	claim	that	our	findings	are	generalizable	to	populations	others	than	political	users	of	Twitter	in	the	two	countries.	At	the	same	time,	we	consider	these	samples	useful	for	understanding	online	political	networks.	
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population	or	even	social	media	users	in	general.	We	focus	on	Twitter	because	it	is	one	of	the	most	popular	social	media	platforms	worldwide	and	its	structure	makes	it	especially	germane	to	our	hypotheses,	insofar	as	it	facilitates	serendipitous	encounters	with	unanticipated	information	and	is	highly	accessible	to	study,	because	most	of	the	interactions	can	be	retrieved	and	archived.	Testing	our	hypotheses	requires	valid	and	reliable	measures	of	the	political	activities	performed	by	social	media	users,	what	motivates	them,	and	what	kinds	of	information	they	encounter.	We	therefore	devised	unique	surveys	of	representative	samples	of	individuals	who	engaged	in	election-related	conversations	on	Twitter	in	Germany	and	Italy.	Compared	with	analyses	of	behavioral	data	of	individuals’	interactions	on	social	media,	surveying	representative	samples	of	these	users	allows	us	to	measure	constructs,	such	as	characteristics	of	face-to-face	interactions,	which	may	not	be	observable	on	the	basis	of	social	media	activities.	The	potential	downside	is	that	our	results	could	be	artifactual	to	the	extent	that	respondents	systematically	misreport	characteristics	of	online	and	offline	networks.3	Moreover,	as	with	all	cross-sectional	surveys,	our	
																																																								3	We	are	aware	that	there	may	be	social	desirability	bias	in	users’	reported	exposure	to	oppositional	networks.	However,	observing	users’	behavior	in	engaging	with	disagreement	on	social	media	–	even	if	limited	to	only	one	platform,	i.e.	Twitter	–	would	have	required	a	very	extensive	exercise	of	data	collection,	which	is	outside	the	scope	of	this	paper,	and	still	would	have	left	us	without	any	reliable	measure	of	the	characteristics	of	users’	offline	political	networks,	which	is	crucial	to	our	theory	and	hypotheses.	That	being	said,	we	believe	the	social	desirability	bias,	to	the	extent	it	was	present	in	our	data,	should	not	have	substantially	affected	our	findings.		
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data	are	subject	to	some	degree	of	endogeneity	and	therefore	do	not	support	causal	claims	regarding	the	associations	we	observe.			Sampling	political	users	of	Twitter	Because	no	comprehensive	list	of	Twitter	users	–	let	alone,	Twitter	users	who	discuss	elections	–	is	publicly	available,	we	devised	a	strategy	to	construct	sampling	frames	that	are	as	inclusive	as	possible	with	respect	to	our	populations.	Because	most	of	the	sources	and	messages	posted	by	Twitter	users	are	publicly	accessible,4	we	rely	on	the	contents	of	these	messages	to	identify	our	populations,	which	we	define	as	those	Twitter	users	who	posted	messages	concerning	the	German	and	Italian	elections	of	2013.	We	pinpoint	these	users	on	the	basis	of	election-related	keywords	–	the	names	of	the	main	parties,	their	leaders,	and	the	topical	hashtags	for	the	elections5	–	contained	in	the	messages	they	posted.	We	used	these	keywords	to	query	Twitter’s	Streaming	API	during	each	country’s	extended	campaign	season6	and	retrieved	about	5.8	million	tweets	from	over	151,000	unique	users	in	Germany	and	3	million	tweets	from	over	275,000	unique																																																									4	The	only	messages	that	are	inaccessible	are	those	by	users	who	“protect”	their	profiles,	making	their	posts	visible	only	to	those	who	“follow”	them.	Because	only	5%	of	Twitter	accounts	are	protected	(Liu,	Kliman-Silver	and	Mislove	2014),	our	inability	to	observe	protected	tweets	should	not	substantially	bias	our	findings.		5	The	full	list	of	keywords	is	reported	in	Appendix	1	(available	at	http://webpoleu.altervista.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/SM+S-appendix-online-nw.pdf)		6	Retrieval	dates	were	06/28/2013-09/22/2013	for	Germany	and	01/18/2013-02/28/2013	for	Italy.	
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users	in	Italy.7		Fielding	a	survey	of	Twitter	users	From	these	lists	of	users,	we	randomly	selected	43,000	users	in	Germany	and	35,000	in	Italy	and	contacted	them	via	Twitter	through	an	automated	script	that	delivered	a	personalized	message	as	follows:	“@[username]	University	research	on	social	media	use:	Would	you	like	to	participate?	[link	to	the	survey].”8	Because	our	invitations	were	delivered	in	such	a	way	that	recipients	were	asked	to	share	their	opinions	with	strangers	via	social	media,	respondents	to	our	surveys	may	differ	from	those	who	refused	to	answer	in	terms	of	their	willingness	to	express	their	opinions	to	strangers.	People	who	are	more	open	to	engaging	with	strangers																																																									7	The	fact	that	we	spent	more	time	crawling	tweets	for	the	German	(vs.	Italian)	election	explains	why	we	have	more	tweets	for	the	former.	Because	we	used	comparable	search	keywords,	the	numbers	of	unique	users	that	we	obtained	for	each	country	are	consistent	with	Twitter	diffusion	rates.	8	Although	these	messages	are	technically	public,	because	they	were	addressed	specifically	to	the	users	in	our	samples,	no	one	else	on	Twitter	could	see	them	unless	they	followed	our	account	(which	had	no	followers)	or	were	searching	based	on	keywords	included	in	our	message.	Some	addressees	might	have	shared	the	link	to	our	survey	with	other	people	and	so,	in	principle,	some	users	outside	of	our	samples	may	have	taken	the	survey.	In	the	German	survey,	we	asked	respondents	whether	they	had	received	a	direct	message	from	us	and	found	that	94%	reported	that	they	did.	We	deleted	from	our	dataset	all	the	information	from	respondents	who	had	not	received	a	direct	invitation	from	us.	Although	we	did	not	employ	this	control	for	the	Italian	survey,	in	a	follow-up	study	we	found	that	97%	of	respondents	had	received	a	direct	personal	invitation	from	us.	Controls	based	on	IP	addresses	ensured	that	the	surveys	could	be	answered	only	once	from	the	same	computer.	Because	we	filtered	the	Italian,	but	not	the	German	tweets	by	language,	and	because,	unlike	Italian,	German	is	widely	spoken	abroad,	we	asked	individuals	contacted	for	the	German	survey	whether	they	were	German	citizens	or	residents,	and	excluded	the	39%	who	answered	negatively.	This	percentage	was	quite	high	because	the	keywords	we	searched	for	are	likely	to	be	discussed	outside	Germany.	For	instance,	the	German	chancellor	is	often	featured	in	the	news	of	most	European	Union	countries	due	to	her	central	role	in	EU	politics.		
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on	social	media	might	also	be	more	likely	to	encounter	disagreeing	opinions	on	these	platforms.	As	a	result,	it	is	possible	that	our	sample	may	over-estimate	exposure	to	political	disagreement	online.	Although	we	acknowledge	this	potential	bias,	we	emphasize	that	it	works	against	our	first	and	third	hypotheses	(see	above),	while	it	does	not	affect	our	ability	to	validly	test	our	second	hypothesis.	In	sum,	we	have	no	reason	to	believe	that	our	findings	are	an	artifact	of	the	method	we	chose	to	contact	our	respondents.	A	total	1,143	(Germany)	and	1,493	(Italy)	individuals	answered	at	least	half	of	the	questions,	which	corresponds	to	response	rates	of	4%.9	Because	these	are	by	no	means	high	figures	–	although	they	are	not	much	lower	than	the	single-digit	response	rates	that	are	common	in	telephone	surveys10	–	in	Appendix	2-311	we	illustrate	evidence	suggesting	that	our	respondents	may	be	considered	representative	of	Germans	and	Italians	who	discussed	the	2013	elections	on	Twitter,	and	that	the	differences	that	could	be	measured	between	these	two	
																																																								9	The	surveys	were	in	the	field	for	about	two	months	in	Italy	and	four	months	in	Germany.	Such	prolonged	fieldwork	was	motivated	by	two	considerations.	First,	logistical	considerations	forced	us	to	limit	the	number	of	invitations	we	sent	out	each	day.	Secondly,	we	attempted	to	contact	most	respondents	twice	in	order	to	increase	the	response	rate.		10	For	instance,	Pew	reported	average	9%	response	rates	for	its	telephone	surveys	in	2012.	See	http://www.people-press.org/2012/05/15/assessing-the-representativeness-of-public-opinion-surveys/	(accessed	August	21,	2014).	11	All	Appendices	can	be	accessed	at	http://webpoleu.altervista.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/SM+S-appendix-online-nw.pdf.	
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groups	were	taken	into	account	in	our	analysis.12		Political	users	of	Twitter	versus	general	population	samples	Understanding	the	behaviors	of	representative	samples	of	Twitter	users	who	commented	on	their	countries’	elections	enables	us	to	understand	political	communication	on	social	media	platforms	and	the	factors	that	shape	it	(see	Bode	&	Dalrymple,	2014,	and	Bekafigo	&	McBride,	2013,	for	other	representative	surveys	of	Twitter	users).	At	the	same	time,	focusing	on	the	specific	population	of	individuals	who	posted	at	least	one	election-related	tweet	does	not	allow	us	to	generalize	to	other	populations,	such	as	citizens	who	read	(but	do	not	post)	political	messages	on	Twitter.	To	the	extent	that	our	survey	respondents	were	more	engaged	in	politics	than	the	general	population,	we	would	expect—on	the	basis	of	prior	research	(e.g.,	Mutz,	2006)—that	they	would	be	less	eager	to	engage	with	contrary	views;	we	take	this	possibility	into	account	by	controlling	for	relevant	political	attitudes	in	our	analyses.13		
																																																								12	See	also	Vaccari	et	al.	(2015)	for	a	detailed	description	of	the	methods	we	employed	to	assess	and	improve	the	representativeness	of	our	sample.	13	We	did	not	measure	respondents’	partisanship	because	this	concept	has	proved	to	be	more	difficult	to	measure,	and	less	useful	in	the	study	of	voting	behavior,	outside	the	United	States	and	United	Kingdom	(see	Holmberg,	2007).	Nor	did	we	measure	respondents’	online	and	offline	discussion	network	size,	which	is	likely	to	be	associated	with	the	heterogeneity	of	the	views	they	are	exposed	to	(Gil	de	Zúñiga	&	Valenzuela,	2011).		
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Variables	Although	our	respondents	were	recruited	via	Twitter,	our	primary	independent	and	dependent	measures	focus	on	general	social	media	use	because	individuals’	online	interactions,	political	and	otherwise,	are	not	limited	to	one	platform,	but	often	integrate	many	of	them:	for	instance,	a	person	can	use	Twitter	to	share	a	YouTube	video	or	a	Facebook	status	update,	or	an	Instagram	picture.	When	we	asked	respondents	to	indicate	social	networking	platforms	on	which	they	had	a	profile,	the	median	respondent	had	profiles	in	4	out	of	10	platforms	we	tested	in	Italy	and	5	out	of	10	in	Germany.		 Our	dependent	variables	measured	the	types	of	political	networks	that	individuals	engage	with	on	social	media,	in	response	to	two	questions:	“How	often	do	you	[agree/disagree]	with	the	political	opinions	and	contents	that	other	people	post	on	social	media?”.	Respondents	could	answer	with	one	of	four	categories:		
• “always	or	nearly	always”	(4%	of	German	and	0.6%	of	Italian	respondents	for	agreement;	1%	of	Germans	and	0.8%	of	Italians	for	disagreement);	
• “often”	(43,1%	of	German	and	42.4%	of	Italian	respondents	for	agreement;	18.1%	of	Germans	and	21.8%	of	Italians	for	disagreement);	
• “only	sometimes”	(50.3%	of	German	and	55.9%	of	Italian	respondents	for	agreement;	77.8%	of	Germans	and	76.3%	of	Italians	for	disagreement);	
• “never”	(2.6%	of	German	and	1.1%	of	Italian	respondents	for	agreement;	
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3.1%	of	Germans	and	1.1%	of	Italians	for	disagreement).			As	Nir	(2011)	showed,	mixed	political	networks	have	important	implications	for	political	engagement,	and	should	thus	not	be	treated	simply	as	an	intermediate	category	between	supportive	and	oppositional	ones.	This	is	why	we	use	as	dependent	variables	dichotomous	measures	representing	each	of	these	types	of	networks	rather	than	a	combined	ordinal	measure	of	the	continuum	of	supportive,	mixed,	and	oppositional	networks.	Because	only	about	5%	used	the	most	extreme	categories,	we	combined	the	first	two	and	the	last	two	response	categories	and	then	constructed	a	composite	measure	corresponding	to	four	types	of	network	structures:		
• respondents	who	claimed	to	always	or	often	encounter	agreement	and	rarely	or	never	disagreement	were	classified	as	participating	in	supportive	networks;	
• respondents	who	claimed	to	always	or	often	encounter	disagreement	and	rarely	or	never	agreement	were	classified	as	participating	in	oppositional	networks;		
• respondents	who	claimed	to	always	or	often	encounter	both	agreement	and	disagreement	were	classified	as	participating	in	mixed	networks,	and	
• respondents	who	claimed	to	rarely	or	never	encounter	agreement	or	
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disagreement	were	classified	as	participating	in	neutral	networks.14		The	independent	variables	required	to	test	our	hypotheses	involve	the	characteristics	of	respondents’	offline	political	networks	(H2)	and	the	proportion	of	political	messages	they	exchange	on	social	media	(H3).		We	test	H2	by	focusing	on	responses	to	the	questions	“How	often	do	you	usually	[agree/disagree]	with	the	opinions	of	people	with	whom	you	talk	about	politics?”	These	questions	immediately	followed	a	specific	question	about	how	frequently	respondents	discussed	politics	in	face-to-face	contacts	with	friends	and	family.	The	response	modes	were	the	same	as	for	the	questions	about	social	media	and	we	derived	combined	measures	of	supportive	(36.5%	of	German	and	34.8%	of	Italian	respondents),	oppositional	(16.6%	of	German	and	25.2%	of	Italian	respondents),	mixed	(8.6%	of	German	and	8.2%	of	Italian	respondents),	and	neutral	(38.3%	of	German	and	31.8%	of	Italian	respondents)	offline	networks	in	the	same	ways	as	we	did	for	social	media	networks	(treating	neutral	networks	as	the	reference	category).																																																										14	By	including	respondents	(coded	as	“0”)	who	rarely	or	never	encounter	agreement	or	disagreement	on	social	media,	and	who	can	thus	be	expected	to	be	disengaged	from	political	discussions,	we	may	confound	individuals’	political	networks	with	the	frequency	with	which	they	discuss	politics.	We	address	this	problem	in	our	multivariate	analyses	by	controlling	for	intensity	of	political	discussion.	Moreover,	we	tested	alternative	models	in	which	respondents	in	neutral	political	networks	were	omitted	rather	than	coded	as	“0.”	These	models,	reported	in	Appendix	4	(available	at	http://webpoleu.altervista.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/SM+S-appendix-online-nw.pdf),	yield	findings	consistent	with	the	results	of	the	main	models	reported	in	Table	1.	
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We	test	H3	by	averaging	answers	to	two	separate	questions,	one	for	posting	and	one	for	reading	political	messages.	The	questions	were:	“Thinking	about	everything	you	have	recently	[posted/read	from	people	you	follow	or	are	in	contact	with]	on	social	media,	such	as	status	updates,	comments,	or	links	to	news	stories—about	how	much	is	related	to	politics,	political	issues	or	the	2013	elections?”.	Respondents	could	answer	both	questions	by	indicating	a	number	between	0	(none)	and	10	(all).15	The	resulting	variable	averaged	4.46	(SD	2.58)	for	the	German	and	4.46	(SD	2.27)	for	the	Italian	sample.	
	
Findings	Bearing	on	H1,	Figure	1	shows	the	percentages	of	German	and	Italian	respondents	who	engage	with	supportive,	oppositional,	mixed,	and	neutral	political	networks	on	social	media.	Respondents	are	substantially	more	likely	to	engage	with	supportive	rather	than	oppositional	networks	(40.6%	versus	12.5%	in	Germany	and	35.8%	versus	15.3%	in	Italy),	and	in	both	cases	the	differences	are	statistically	significant.16	Participation	in	networks	that	exhibit	disagreement	with	respondents’	opinions	is	not,	however,	infrequent:	in	both	countries	oppositional	and	mixed	networks	(combined)	affect	one	in	five	respondents—one	in	three	if	we																																																									15	In	the	Italian	questionnaire,	the	scale	ranged	from	0	to	100,	so	we	divided	the	values	by	10	to	make	these	variables	comparable	across	countries.	16	t=11.782	(p=.000)	in	Germany	and	t=10.565	(p=.000)	in	Italy	according	to	paired	samples	t-tests	(two-tailed).		
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exclude	those	in	“neutral”	networks	that	are	disengaged	from	politics.	These	findings	support	H1,	insofar	as	respondents	on	average	encounter	more	agreement	than	disagreement,	but	they	also	suggest	that	for	some	people	social	media	platforms	are	not	“echo	chambers”	of	univocal	agreement,	but	“contrarian	clubs”	where	political	disagreement	is	common.	Another	interesting	finding	is	that	about	two	in	five	of	our	respondents	participate	in	networks	in	which	no	particular	political	opinions	emerge,	and	this	group	is	the	modal	one	in	the	Italian	sample.	Thus,	even	among	those	social	media	users	who	communicated	at	least	once	about	the	election,	exposure	to	very	few	political	opinions	is	approximately	as	likely	as	exposure	to	attitude-congruent	opinions.	FIGURE	1	ABOUT	HERE	We	address	our	remaining	hypotheses	by	conducting	three	logistic	regressions	(summarized	in	Table	1)17	that,	in	each	country,	predict	whether	respondents	report	being	part	of	supportive,	oppositional,	or	mixed	political	networks	on	social	media	as	a	function	of	the	characteristics	of	their	offline	political	networks	(H2),	and	the	proportion	of	political	messages	they	exchange	on	social	media	(H3).		The	models	include	control	variables	for	socio-demographic	
																																																								17	Table	1	reports	estimated	logit	coefficients.	Full	statistical	information	on	our	models	is	reported	in	Appendix	5-10,	available	at	http://webpoleu.altervista.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/SM+S-appendix-online-nw.pdf.	
	26		
characteristics,18	political	attitudes	(political	efficacy,	interest	in	politics,	and	trust	in	political	parties),	frequency	of	offline	political	discussion,	and	frequency	of	use	of	different	media	to	get	political	information.	We	also	control	for	respondents’	preferred	use	of	social	media,	distinguishing	between	those	who	claimed	to	consider	social	media	to	be	more	important	for	finding	people	with	similar	(vs.	different)	viewpoints,	in	comparison	with	their	own.19	We	introduced	this	variable	in	accordance	with	the	“uses	and	gratification”	theory,	which	contends	that	individuals’	preferences	may	shape	the	type	of	conversational	experiences	they	have	on	social	media.	Controlling	for	respondents’	preferred	use	of	social	media	provides	a	more	precise	assessment	of	the	specific	role	played	by	broader	patterns	of	political	conversation	as	well	as	habits	in	the	political	use	of	social	media	when	it	comes	to	the	development	of	citizens’	online	networks.20	TABLE	1	ABOUT	HERE																																																									18	Because	our	income	variable	included	a	large	proportion	of	missing	data,	rather	than	introducing	bias	through	listwise	deletion	(King,	Honaker,	Joseph,	&	Scheve	2001),	we	mean-replaced	these	missing	values	and	added	a	dummy	variable	to	the	analysis	to	identify	these	cases.	In	this	framework,	the	coefficient	for	any	given	variable	with	missing	data	should	be	interpreted	as	the	effect	of	that	variable	on	our	dependent	variable	for	the	cases	for	which	we	have	observations	of	the	independent	variable	in	question.	We	thank	Larry	Bartels	for	suggesting	this	approach.	The	coefficients	for	the	dummy	variables	identifying	the	missing	cases	–	which	are	essentially	meaningless	because	they	are	simply	a	function	of	whatever	value	we	use	to	replace	the	missing	observations	–	are	not	included	in	the	tables.	19	For	question	wording,	response	modes	and	descriptive	statistics	related	to	all	control	variables	see	Appendix	11,	available	at	http://webpoleu.altervista.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/SM+S-appendix-online-nw.pdf.	20	In	Appendix	12	(available	at	http://webpoleu.altervista.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/SM+S-appendix-online-nw.pdf)	we	show	that	all	our	findings	hold	even	if	we	exclude	this	variable	from	the	models.	
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As	can	be	seen	from	the	first	block	of	coefficients	in	Table	1,	H2	is	supported	in	both	countries,	insofar	as	we	see	positive	and	significant	associations	between	all	relevant	pairs	of	independent	and	dependent	variables.	As	an	example	of	the	strength	of	these	associations,	if	we	construct	a	hypothetical	Italian	respondent	that	has	values	equal	to	the	median	(for	interval	and	ordinal	variables)	or	modal	(for	categorical	variables)	values	in	the	sample,	then	the	probability	that	this	hypothetical	(male)	respondent	would	engage	with	supportive	political	networks	on	social	media	is	48%	if	he	also	engages	with	supportive	offline	networks,	but	only	26%	if	he	engages	with	either	mixed,	oppositional,	or	neutral	offline	networks.	The	results	also	highlight	some	interesting	differences	between	the	two	countries.	While	in	Germany	respondents	who	engage	with	oppositional	networks	offline	are	significantly	more	likely	to	encounter	either	oppositional	or	mixed	networks	online,	in	Italy	engagement	with	offline	oppositional	networks	is	solely	associated	with	oppositional	networks	on	social	media.	By	contrast,	whereas	in	Germany	those	who	engage	with	mixed	offline	networks	are	more	likely	to	engage	with	the	same	types	of	networks	on	social	media,	in	Italy	those	who	are	part	of	mixed	offline	networks	are	significantly	more	likely	to	interact	with	either	oppositional	or	mixed	networks	on	social	media.	Individuals’	online	and	offline	experiences	tend	to	overlap,	but	to	the	extent	that	they	do	not	overlap	perfectly,	social	media	functions	as	an	echo	chamber	only	for	those	individuals	who	also	
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possess	homogenous	offline	networks.	Another	way	to	interpret	these	associations	is	that	political	networks	on	social	media	are	more	likely	to	add	than	to	detract	to	the	overall	diversity	of	political	viewpoints	to	which	individuals	are	exposed.21	The	data	also	support	H3,	namely	the	expectation	of	a	positive	association	between	the	intensity	of	online	political	involvement	and	the	probability	of	participating	in	supportive	networks.22	In	both	countries	the	more	individuals	post	and	read	political	messages	on	social	media,	the	more	likely	they	are	to	engage	with	supportive	networks.	As	an	example,	if	we	set	all	variables	to	their	median	or	modal	levels	in	the	German	sample,	a	hypothetical	respondent	has	a	39%	probability	of	engaging	with	a	supportive	network.	If,	however,	the	intensity	of	his/her	activity	is	increased	to	one	standard	deviation	above	the	median,	the	probability	of	engaging	with	supportive	networks	increases	to	49%.	Conversely,	if	the	intensity	of	his/her	activity	is	one	standard	deviation	below	the	median,	the	probability	of	engaging	with	supportive	networks	decreases	to	30%.																																																										21	As	we	show	in	Appendix	13-14	(available	at	http://webpoleu.altervista.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/SM+S-appendix-online-nw.pdf),	these	patterns	are	also	revealed	by	bivariate	analyses:	for	instance,	56%	of	Germans	and	52%	of	Italians	who	engage	with	supportive	networks	offline	also	engage	with	supportive	networks	online.		22	As	can	be	seen	in	Appendix	4	(available	at	http://webpoleu.altervista.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/SM+S-appendix-online-nw.pdf),	when	we	excluded	respondents	in	neutral	networks,	intensity	of	political	discussion	was	positively	but	not	significantly	related	with	engagement	with	supportive	networks,	but	it	was	negatively	and	significantly	related	with	engagement	with	oppositional	networks.	We	see	this	finding	as	the	other	side	of	the	coin	of	the	finding	in	our	main	models:	in	one	case,	the	more	intensely	respondents	discuss	politics	on	social	media,	the	more	likely	they	are	to	do	so	with	supportive	networks;	in	the	other	case,	the	more	intensely	respondents	discuss	politics	on	social	media,	the	less	likely	they	are	to	do	so	with	oppositional	networks.	
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Finally,	the	effects	pertaining	to	the	control	variable	measuring	preferences	for	political	agreement	vs.	disagreement	on	social	media	deserve	a	brief	comment.	In	both	countries,	respondents	who	attribute	greater	importance	to	social	media	for	encountering	agreement	as	opposed	to	disagreement	(positive	values	of	the	variable)	are	significantly	more	likely	to	engage	with	supportive	networks	on	these	platforms.	To	the	contrary	the	association	between	such	variable	(where	respondents	valuing	social	media	as	more	important	for	encountering	disagreeing	than	agreeing	others	have	negative	values)	and	engagement	with	oppositional	views	is	negative	in	both	countries,	but	it	is	significant	only	in	Italy.	This	pattern	may	suggest	that,	for	individuals	who	approach	social	media	deliberately	in	search	of	agreement	(vs.	disagreement),	it	may	be	relatively	easy	to	obtain	such	agreement.	Instead,	for	those	preferring	to	seek	out	disagreement,	it	may	be	more	difficult	to	locate	and	participate	in	“contrarian	clubs.”			
Conclusions	We	have	shown	that	German	and	Italian	Twitter	users	who	communicate	about	elections	are	more	likely	to	do	so	in	networks	that	support	rather	than	challenge	their	views,	consistent	with	the	notion	that	social	media	facilitates	the	emergence	of	echo	chambers.	At	the	same	time,	contrarian	clubs,	which	involve	frequent	encounters	with	dissonant	opinions	–	whether	in	oppositional	or	mixed	networks	
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–	are	less	exceptional	than	expected.	We	may	have	come	across	an	important	parallelism	between	studies	of	political	communication	offline	and	online:	as	noted	by	Huckfeldt	et	al.	(2004)	with	respect	to	offline	networks,	heterogeneity	persists	on	social	media	even	though	homogeneity	is	the	modal	outcome.		We	have	approached	citizens’	experiences	with	political	agreement	and	disagreement	on	social	media	through	the	theoretical	lens	of	hybridization	in	political	communication,	of	“uses	and	gratifications”	theory	and	by	taking	into	account	the	importance	of	individual	attitudes	in	high-choice	media	environments.	This,	in	turn,	led	us	to	focus	on	aspects	that	are	likely	to	differentiate	individuals,	as	opposed	to	treating	everyone	as	guided	by	technological	affordances	in	the	same	way.	Thus,	we	have	been	able	to	demonstrate	that	the	extent	to	which	social	media	functions	as	an	echo	chamber	(as	opposed	to	a	contrarian	club)	varies	across	individuals.	This,	in	turn,	suggests	that	understanding	political	dynamics	in	choice-enhancing	platforms	may	be	better	served	by	an	appreciation	that	different	users	have	different	traits,	preferences,	and	social	networks	that	affect	their	behaviors	and	experiences	rather	than	an	assumption	that	most	or	all	users	employ	the	selective	features	of	social	media	to	pursue	the	same	goals,	thus	leading	to	fairly	predictable	and	monolithic	outcomes.		More	specifically,	we	hope	to	have	shed	light	on	broader	dynamics	of	political	communication	as	well	as	specific	habits	pertaining	to	the	political	use	of	
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social	media	that	help	to	explain	how	various	platforms	give	rise	to	different	types	of	political	networks.	Our	observation	that	online	and	offline	networks	tend	to	resemble	one	another	suggests	that	understanding	the	dynamics	of	political	communication	requires	a	holistic	approach	that	encompasses	both	contexts.	As	increasing	numbers	of	citizens	rely	on	social	media	for	political	information,	which	they	often	encounter	by	discussing	public	affairs	with	others,	the	overall	diversity	of	viewpoints	in	contemporary	democracies	is	not	likely	to	be	dramatically	reduced	when	compared	with	face-to-face	discussions;	in	some	cases,	it	may	even	be	broadened.	However,	the	use	of	social	media	seems	to	diminish	political	diversity	for	those	who	participate	in	more	or	less	entirely	supportive	offline	networks	and	who	prefer	engaging	with	people	with	whom	they	tend	to	agree.		At	the	level	of	individual	behaviors	online,	our	finding	that	the	more	people	post	and	read	political	messages	on	social	media,	the	more	likely	they	are	to	encounter	supportive	networks	indicates	that,	all	else	being	equal,	the	greatest	proportion	of	social	media	messages	exchanged	involve	interactions	among	individuals	who	agree	with	one	another.	This	highlights	a	crucial	methodological	issue	in	the	study	of	online	political	communication.	To	the	extent	that	the	quantity	of	messages	and	interactions	that	can	be	observed	on	social	media	is	associated	with	the	levels	of	agreement	among	individuals	who	take	part	in	these	exchanges,	scholars	interested	in	the	implications	of	social	media	for	political	diversity	should	
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be	aware	that	taking	messages	or	connections	as	their	unit	of	analysis	may	overestimate	the	pervasiveness	of	homogeneity	as	actually	experienced	by	
individuals.		Finally,	our	study	has	confirmed	the	centrality	of	hybridity	in	contemporary	environments	of	political	discussion.	Building	on	Chadwick’s	(2013)	theorizing,	we	have	investigated	the	relationship	between	newer	(i.e.,	social	media)	and	older	(i.e.,	face-to-face)	networks	of	political	discussion,	and	have	observed	that	these	two	types	of	environments—and	their	underlying	logics—are	integrated	rather	than	separated.	Our	findings	also	have	important	implications	for	power—a	crucial	component	of	Chadwick’s	theory—insofar	as	they	suggest	that	politically	active	citizens	will	be	unlikely	to	find	much	challenging	content	on	social	media,	but	they	may	be	able	to	reach	less	engaged	users—who	according	to	our	findings	are	less	likely	to	be	part	of	exclusively	homophilic	networks—with	oppositional	points	of	view.	Under	certain	conditions,	these	interactions	could	create	opportunities	for	political	persuasion	and,	thus,	the	possibility	for	some	to	exercise	influence	over	others.		
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Figure	1	–	Engagement	with	different	types	of	political	networks	on	social	media	
(percentages	among	country	respondents)	
	
	Percentages	based	on	self-reports,	see	text	for	coding	of	responses	on	network	political	agreement	and	disagreement	into	reported	categories.	Paired	samples	two-tailed	t-test	gave	the	following	results:	Supportive	versus	Mixed	networks	t=11.782	(p=.000)	in	Germany	t=10.565	(p=.000)	in	Italy;	Supportive	vs	Mixed	networks	t=15.386	(p=.000)	in	Germany	and	t=16.515	(p=.000)	in	Italy;	Dangerous	vs	Mixed	networks	t=2.945	(p.=009)	in	Germany	and	
t=5.843	(p=.000)	in	Italy;	Neutral	vs	Safe	networks	t=-.101	(p=.920)	in	Germany	and	t=2.371	(p.=.018)	in	Italy;	Neutral	vs	Dangerous	networks	t=8.081	(p=.000)	in	Germany	and	t=13.077	(p=.000)	in	Italy;	Neutral	vs	Diverse	networks	t=13.234	(p=.000)	in	Germany	and	t=19.609	(p=.000)	in	Italy.
Table	1	–	Dependent	Variable(s):	Types	of	Political	Networks	Respondents	Engage	
with	on	Social	Media	
		 Germany	 Italy		 Supportive	 Opposition	 Mixed	 Supportive	 Opposition	 Mixed	
Face-to-face	political	networks	(ref.	neutral)	Supportive	 .818**	 -.201	 .832	 .998***	 .183	 .580	Oppositional	 -.381	 .899*	 1.200*	 .040	 1.756***	 .228	Mixed	 -.365	 .489	 1.696**	 .032	 1.082**	 2.072***		 	 	 	 	 	 	Ratio	of	political	messages	on	the	total	exchanged	on	SNS	 .153***	 -.041	 .149	 .120**	 -.058	 .126		 	 	 	 	 	 	Preferred	use	of	social	media	 1.240**	 -1.032	 .224	 1.714***	 -1.056*	 -.675		 	 	 	 	 	 	
Source	of	political	information	 	 	 	 	 	 	Internet	 .078	 1.023	 -.386	 .171	 -.488	 -.983	Newspapers	 -.460	 .360	 -.167	 -.690*	 .060	 -.433	Radio	 -1.046***	 .612	 .562	 -.508*	 .005	 .815	Television	 -.406	 -.264	 -.008	 .078	 -.068	 .911		 	 	 	 	 	 	
Political	efficacy	(disagreement	with	following	sentences)	“People	don't	have	any	say”	 .108	 -.201	 -.581	 .042	 .469	 -.048	“Public	officials	don’t	care”	 .167	 -.375	 .849	 .338	 -.239	 -.886	“Politics	is	too	complicated”	 -.660	 -.039	 .799	 -.098	 .000	 .311		 	 	 	 	 	 	Interest	in	politics	 1.601**	 -.923	 .846	 -.141	 .805	 1.969	Trust	in	political	parties	 -.276	 -.641	 .597	 .379	 -.386	 -.768	Offline	political	discussion	(frequency)	 .079	 .661	 -.118	 .257	 -1.014	 -.587		 	 	 	 	 	 	Gender	(male)	 -.128	 -.227	 .367	 -.211	 .041	 .212	Age	 -.712	 -1.051	 -.401	 -.561	 -.347	 -.798	Education	 -.431	 1.025	 -1.042	 .361	 .290	 .614	Income	 -.582	 1.421	 .812	 -.094	 .227	 -.528		 	 	 	 	 	 	Constant	 -.667	 -3.087**	 -5.569***	 -1.348**	 -1.893**	 -4.822***	
N	 727	 727	 727	 1167	 1167	 1167	%	explained	 69.9	 86.5	 93.4	 68.7	 85.1	 93.4	Nagelkerke	R2	 .241	 .125	 .141	 .164	 .157	 .143	Log-likelihood	 834.045	 518.951	 312.860	 1391.319	 889.100	 503.732		Cell	entries	are	estimated	logit	coefficients	where	the	dependent	variable	is	1	for	the	reported	network	type,	and	all	other	network	types	are	coded	as	0.	(***p≤.001	**p≤.01	*p≤.05).	See	Appendix	5-10	(available	at	http://webpoleu.altervista.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/SM+S-appendix-online-nw.pdf)	for	complete	results	with	standard	errors.	Dummy	variable	identifying	missing	observations	for	income	omitted	from	table,	see	note	18.	All	variables	range	from	0-1	apart	from	political	messages	exchanged	(0-10)	and	preferred	use	of	social	media	(-1	to	1,	with	respondents	who	claimed	that	agreement	was	more	important	than	disagreement	having	positive	values,	whereas	those	who	stated	that	disagreement	was	more	important	than	agreement	having	negative	values,	and	those	who	attributed	equal	importance	to	agreement	and	disagreement	having	a	score	of	zero).		
